One of the main goals of social choice theory is the study of voting
methods. Voting allows for the aggregation of several individual
points of view in order to obtain a result that represents the generalinterest. Thus votes play a vital role in any society. Indeed, to elect
a president of a republic, or deputies, we go through votes.
Unfortunately, the transformation of individual preferences into a
collective preference often leads to voter frustration and, above all,
can lead to conflict. Thus, in the literature on social choice theory,
many studies have been conducted in order to find methods that make
it possible to converge towards the general interest and that generate
less conflict. But it seems that there is no totally satisfactory method.
It is within this framework that, in this article, we are inspired by the
method of Voting based on Arithmetic Mean and Voting by Assent
(VMAVA) and a preference distance allowing to evaluate the
candidates with respect to the ideal candidate (i.e., preferred by all
voters) to propose a voting method that best reflects the voters
preferences.

voting methods, arithmetic mean, assent voting